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Research Highlights 26 
• Children are frequently cast as ‘over-imitators,’ yet previous studies have 27 
typically overlooked many real-world learning dynamics. Here we take a cultural 28 
evolutionary approach, focusing on a key learning strategy: majority-biased 29 
copying.   30 
• We show that children flexibly and adaptively adopt a majority-biased learning 31 
strategy: Copying does not extend to majorities who perform irrelevant actions. 32 
• Our results suggest that the presence of causally irrelevant actions might 33 
substantially alter the operation of adaptive learning biases.  34 
• Our findings support a highly functional and selective integration of social and 35 
causal information in children, rather than accounts of ‘over-imitation’ that 36 
imply unselective copying or causal misunderstanding. 37 
 38 
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Abstract 51 
Human children, in contrast to other species, are frequently cast as prolific ‘over-52 
imitators.’ However, previous studies of ‘over-imitation’ have overlooked many 53 
important real-world social dynamics, and may thus provide an inaccurate account of 54 
this seemingly puzzling and potentially maladaptive phenomenon. Here we investigate 55 
this topic using a cultural evolutionary approach, focusing particularly on the key 56 
adaptive learning strategy of majority-biased copying. Most ‘over-imitation’ research 57 
has been conducted using consistent demonstrations to the observer, but we 58 
systematically varied the frequency of demonstrators that 4- to 6-year-old children 59 
observed performing a causally irrelevant action.  Children who ‘over-imitate’ inflexibly 60 
should copy the majority regardless of whether the majority solution omits or includes 61 
a causally irrelevant action. However, we found that children calibrated their tendency 62 
to acquire the majority behavior, such that copying did not extend to majorities that 63 
performed irrelevant actions. These results are consistent with a highly functional, 64 
adaptive integration of social and causal information, rather than explanations implying 65 
unselective copying or causal misunderstanding. This suggests that our species might 66 
be better characterized as broadly ‘optimal-’ rather than ‘over-’ imitators.   67 
  68 
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Selective copying of the majority suggests children are broadly ‘optimal-’ rather than 69 
‘over-’ imitators 70 
Compared with other animals, humans show an exceptional ability to learn 71 
through the high-fidelity copying of others’ actions (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & 72 
Laland, 2012).  This propensity to engage in faithful copying is thought to play a crucial 73 
role in facilitating cumulative cultural improvement: a hallmark of human culture 74 
(Tomasello, 1999). However, human imitation has also been described as ‘surprisingly 75 
unselective’ or ‘mindless’ (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009), and 76 
susceptible to behavioral ‘inefficiency’ or ‘cost’ (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), following 77 
numerous reports that both children and adults often blanket copy even those parts of 78 
an action sequence that are manifestly causally irrelevant to obtaining the instrumental 79 
goal (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Lyons et al., 80 
2007; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; 81 
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). This phenomenon, dubbed ‘over-imitation’ (Lyons et al., 82 
2007), has received much attention in recent years, being replicated in several cultures 83 
(Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2015; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), and, reported 84 
to increase with age into adulthood (McGuigan et al., 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) 85 
and to be impervious to cues of prestige or success (Chudek, Baron, & Birch, 2016).   86 
 The seemingly counterintuitive nature of  ‘over-imitation’, which has not been 87 
observed in other species (Horner & Whiten, 2005), has led some to propose 88 
explanations grounded in causal cognition, suggesting the demonstration leads 89 
individuals to imitate actions automatically, despite an understanding of the necessary 90 
causal mechanisms (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007).  91 
Such high-fidelity blanket copying, it is argued, might serve to promote facets of cultural 92 
learning that are causally opaque (Lyons et al., 2011, 2007), but may also occasionally 93 
Page 4 of 36Developmental Science
RUNNING HEAD: Over-imitation and majority copying in children 5
malfunction, leading to irrelevant actions being copied blindly, and behavior that 94 
manifests as causal misunderstanding (Whiten et al., 2009).  95 
Others have argued that the phenomenon results instead from more social 96 
processes (Kenward et al., 2011; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2012). 97 
Indeed, the term ‘over-imitation’ is misleading if copying of the causally irrelevant 98 
actions encompasses socially relevant pressures and functions.  For example, 99 
individuals might copy causally irrelevant actions in order to be like, and share 100 
experiences with, the demonstrator, or to affiliate with and encourage the demonstrator 101 
to like them (Meltzoff, 2007; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2013). Likewise, 102 
the unanimity and pedagogical context inherent in most experimental demonstrations 103 
of irrelevant actions might lead participants to believe they are expected by the 104 
experimenter to perform the irrelevant action (Lyons et al., 2011), or that the 105 
demonstration is normative, and they ought to conform to its performance, despite its 106 
social or causal function being unclear (Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp, Behne, Zachow, 107 
Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015).  108 
 The critiques levelled at hypotheses based solely on assumptions about causal 109 
understanding resonate with findings that imitation in both adults and children can be 110 
selective and strategic. Even young children are able to imitate rationally, adjusting 111 
imitative fidelity flexibly in response to a number of contextual factors, including 112 
demonstrator competency (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008) and intentionality 113 
(Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998), constraints upon demonstrators (Gergely, 114 
Bekkering, & Király, 2002), signs of pedagogical engagement (Csibra & Gergely, 2006), 115 
and the perceived task goal (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Legare & Nielsen, 116 
2015).  117 
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 Here we take a cultural evolutionary approach to investigate whether children 118 
are better characterized as ‘over-’ or broadly ‘optimal-’ imitators. Cultural evolutionary 119 
theory predicts that social learning decisions should be strategic regarding whom and 120 
when individuals copy (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), and guided by adaptive learning 121 
biases promoting the emergence, stability and evolution of cultural traits (Boyd & 122 
Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004). Evidence that learning biases are involved in guiding 123 
the use of social information has been provided using both theoretical (Boyd & 124 
Richerson, 1985; Kandler & Laland, 2013) and empirical approaches (Rendell et al., 125 
2011; see Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013b for a review in children). These biases should 126 
be especially tuned to decisions regarding the adoption of causally sub-optimal 127 
behavior, yet they have been little considered in investigations of ‘over-imitation’ (see 128 
McGuigan, 2013; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012 for initial evidence).  129 
Most previous ‘over-imitation’ research has involved the demonstration of a 130 
single sequence of behavior (i.e., the target behavior is performed unanimously) to an 131 
observer (for exceptions see, e.g., Chudek et al., 2016; McGuigan & Robertson, 2015; 132 
Nielsen & Blank, 2011). However, real-world learning often involves observing multiple 133 
individuals behaving differently. Thus, comparing the operation of learning biases in 134 
situations that include, exclude, or vary the degree of irrelevant action performance, by 135 
multiple demonstrators, will be particularly informative regarding (i) the robustness of 136 
children’s propensity to ‘over-imitate’ outside of unanimous conditions, and (ii) the 137 
evaluation of competing explanations of ‘over-imitation.’  138 
Here we consider one type of learning bias that has been a major focus for 139 
cultural evolutionists and psychologists alike: majority-biased copying. The majority 140 
behavior represents the behavior that the greatest proportion of group members have 141 
converged upon, and there is empirical evidence that majority or consensus behavior 142 
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informs copying in both children (Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009; Haun, Rekers, & 143 
Tomasello, 2012; Morgan, Laland, & Harris, 2015) and adults (Coultas, 2004; Morgan, 144 
Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012).  Majority behavior is expected to signal a 145 
relatively safe, reliable, and adaptive behavioral response (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 146 
Wolf, Kurvers, Ward, Krause, & Krause, 2013), making it a particularly suitable 147 
transmission bias for testing hypotheses about the adoption of causally irrelevant 148 
information.  149 
 In the current study, we showed 4- to 6-year-old children a video demonstration 150 
in which we had all four demonstrators perform a causally relevant action, but 151 
systematically varied the number of demonstrators who additionally performed a 152 
causally irrelevant action while retrieving a reward from a puzzle box. Either all, the 153 
majority (3 of 4), the minority (1 of 4), or none of the demonstrators, performed the 154 
causally irrelevant action.  155 
In the first experimental condition, we examined whether children were more 156 
likely to adopt the majority over the minority solution when faced with alternative, but 157 
equivalent, causally relevant task solutions. In line with previous findings (Haun et al., 158 
2012), we expected that children would demonstrate a bias towards copying the 159 
majority’s solution.  160 
Importantly, we then investigated whether majority-biased copying in children 161 
extends to majorities who perform a causally irrelevant action.  If children copy 162 
inflexibly – if ‘over-imitation’ is robust outside of unanimous demonstrations – they 163 
might be expected to copy the solution used by the majority regardless of whether it 164 
omits or includes causally irrelevant actions.  Instead, we predicted that when 165 
presented with a majority performing the irrelevant action and a minority omitting it, 166 
the instrumental framing of our task, coupled with children’s rational and selective 167 
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imitation (Gergely et al., 2002; Want & Harris, 2001), would counter their tendency to 168 
copy the majority, and majority-biased copying would not be detected.  In contrast, in a 169 
condition in which the majority omits the irrelevant action and the minority performs it, 170 
we predicted majority-biased copying. We compared these results to those from a 171 
condition representing the paradigm typically used in ‘over-imitation’ research:  172 
unanimous demonstration of the irrelevant action. Here we predicted that the 173 
unanimity of the demonstration would result in irrelevant action copying at similarly 174 
high levels as previously reported (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007).  A 175 
final condition, with no demonstration, provided the baseline level of irrelevant action 176 
production. Thus, when demonstration of the irrelevant action was unanimous, we 177 
expected it to be copied at high levels, but with anything less than unanimity we did not 178 
expect high levels of ‘over-imitation.’  179 
Participants were provided with multiple (three) attempts at solving the puzzle 180 
box, permitting an evaluation of children’s initial tendency to copy and their tendency to 181 
‘stick with’ performing the demonstrated actions after their own initial experience with 182 
the task. We tested 4- to 6-year-olds, as children within this age range have developed 183 
sensitivity to demonstrator frequency in other learning contexts (Haun et al., 2012; 184 
Morgan et al., 2015; Wilks, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015), as well as an ability to 185 
engage in rational and selective imitation (Gergely et al., 2002; Want & Harris, 2001), 186 
and are considered prolific ‘over-imitators’ (Kenward, 2012; Lyons et al., 2007; Nielsen 187 
& Tomaselli, 2010).  188 
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 189 
Method 190 
Participants and Materials 191 
Two hundred and fifty-two 4- to 6-year-old children visiting UK science centers 192 
(128 males; 4-year-olds: M = 4;5, range = 4;0 - 4;11; 5-year-olds: M = 5;6, range = 5;0 - 193 
5;11; 6-year-olds: M = 6;5, range = 6;0 - 6;11) were included in the final sample. Eight 194 
additional children were tested but excluded due to experimenter error (2), apparatus 195 
failure (3), parental interference (2), and refusal to interact with the apparatus (1).  196 
The ‘Sweep-Drawer Box’ (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013a; see Figure 1), a two-197 
action transparent apparatus, was used with minor modifications. Retrieval of a capsule 198 
containing a sticker was dependent upon the capsule being moved to a sliding black 199 
opaque door by one of two spatially separated and functionally independent 200 
manipulandi: a silver sweeper with blue handle (Figure 1a), or a blue drawer with red 201 
handle (Figure 1b). In some demonstrations, a causally irrelevant action (see Figure 1c), 202 
involving the demonstrator twice sliding the black door open and closed, preceded use 203 
of the sweep/drawer manipulandum.  204 
 205 
Design and Procedure 206 
In a between-groups design, participants were randomly allocated to one of five 207 
conditions (C1-C5). There were no significant differences in the distribution of age (F(4, 208 
246)=0.26, p=.91) and approximately equal numbers of boys and girls in each condition. 209 
In four experimental conditions (C1-C4, N=201), children watched a video showing four 210 
female demonstrators (distinguished by colored shirts) retrieving the sticker capsule 211 
from the apparatus in turn, before attempting capsule retrieval themselves three times. 212 
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The fifth condition (C5, N=51) served as a non-social, baseline control in which 213 
participants received no video demonstration.  214 
The first experimental condition (relevant actions only: C1, N=51) investigated 215 
whether children displayed majority-biased copying when choosing between two 216 
causally relevant actions: sweep versus drawer retrieval. Children in this condition saw 217 
the majority (three demonstrators) perform the alternate relevant action to the 218 
minority person. In the remaining three experimental conditions, each child saw all four 219 
demonstrators perform the same causally relevant action (i.e., sweep or drawer), but 220 
the number of demonstrators who additionally performed the irrelevant action varied 221 
between one (i.e., minority irrelevant: C2), three (i.e., majority irrelevant: C3), and four 222 
(i.e., all irrelevant: C4) across conditions (see Table 1). The identity of the minority 223 
demonstrator, order in which the minority and majority performed, and use of sweep 224 
and drawer methods were counterbalanced within and between conditions.  The 225 
majority demonstrators always appeared consecutively, with the minority individual 226 
demonstrating her method immediately before or after them. To control for 227 
demonstration frequency, the three majority demonstrators retrieved the capsule once 228 
each, while the minority individual demonstrated her method three times.  229 
Children were tested individually in a screened–off area at the science center, 230 
with parents sat at a distance. Each child chose a sticker, which the experimenter placed 231 
inside the reward capsule before dropping it into the puzzle box. The child was told that 232 
they had to get the capsule out of the box and then could keep the sticker. For the 233 
experimental conditions (C1-4), the child was then shown a picture of the four 234 
demonstrators and asked to watch a video showing them retrieving the sticker (see 235 
supporting information S1for a detailed procedural script).  236 
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Children were next told it was their turn to try to get the sticker out and were 237 
free to approach the apparatus and interact with it until (i) the capsule had been 238 
retrieved, (ii) 2 minutes had elapsed, or (iii) the child refused to continue. Participants 239 
who retrieved the sticker at T1 were offered two further attempts (T2 and T3); between 240 
trials the experimenter reset the apparatus out of sight while the child chose a new 241 
sticker.   242 
  Children assigned to the baseline condition (C5) received the same initial 243 
instructions and prompts as children in the experimental groups but watched no video. 244 
All children who participated in the study received a sticker reward.     245 
 246 
Coding and Analysis 247 
Each participant was scored for three measures on each response trial: (i) 248 
successful removal of the capsule, (ii) number of times they performed the irrelevant 249 
action (sliding the door open and closed prior to operating the manipulandi), and (iii) 250 
the manipulandum used during retrieval (sweep or drawer). The experimenter coded 251 
100% of the sample from video records. An independent observer, blind to condition 252 
and hypotheses, coded a random sample of 25%. Inter-observer reliability was 253 
excellent: Chronbach’s alpha = 0.99 for the number of irrelevant actions performed, and 254 
Cohen’s kappa = 1.00 for the two other measures.  255 
All analyses were carried out in R version 3.1.3. Significance testing of main 256 
effects in regression models was undertaken using Likelihood-ratio ()	tests, and 257 
Tukey post-hoc comparisons were performed using the package multcomp. 258 
Conventional binomial tests were used to assess whether copying was biased towards 259 
the majority or minority behavior during a single response trial (i.e, differed from 260 
chance level at e.g., T1). To assess whether children demonstrated an overall copying 261 
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bias across all response trials combined (i.e., data pooled across T1-T3), we adopted the 262 
option-bias method (Kendal, Kendal, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2009), to account for within-263 
individual correlations in responses across trials (see supporting information S4). For 264 
analyses of persistence in copying across trials, we computed a binary (yes/no) 265 
measure of copying persistence to indicate whether children consistently reproduced 266 
the demonstrated action in every response trial (i.e., performed it in T1, T2, and T3). 267 
Two-tailed p values are reported throughout.  268 
 269 
Results 270 
We present the results in three sections. First, we examine children’s copying of 271 
unanimous demonstrators. We then investigate the influence of the majority on 272 
children’s tendency to copy. Finally, we additionally examine the effect of demonstrator 273 
unanimity on children’s initial decisions to copy, and their tendency to persist with 274 
performing the demonstrated actions across all trials.  A descriptive overview of 275 
irrelevant and relevant action copying for each trial in each condition can be found in 276 
the supporting information; see Table S1. Throughout, preliminary analyses were 277 
conducted to test for age, sex, and primacy effects (where applicable), and in most cases 278 
no significant effects were found; the few exceptions are reported below.  279 
 First, to confirm the utility of social information to naïve children attempting the 280 
task, we note that children who received a social demonstration (C1-4) were 281 
significantly more successful at retrieving the reward at T1 (success rate = 100%) than 282 
those (C5) who did not (six participants failed in C5: success rate = 88.2%; Fisher’s 283 
Exact Test, p<0.001). All but three participants who retrieved the reward at T1 also did 284 
so in T2 and T3.  285 
 286 
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Copying When the Demonstrators Were Unanimous 287 
 (i) Causally relevant actions. We pooled data across the three conditions in 288 
which children saw all four demonstrators performing the same causally relevant action 289 
(i.e., sweep or drawer retrieval, C2-C4 combined, N=150). Despite successful children in 290 
the baseline condition showing a bias towards retrieval using the sweep manipulandum 291 
(78% of all retrievals used sweep: Fisher’s Exact Test, p<.001), children who saw a 292 
unanimous demonstration showed a strong tendency to copy the relevant action they 293 
had witnessed (92% copying across all trials combined [91% sweep, 93% drawer]: 294 
Fisher’s Exact Test, p<.001). A logistic generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) revealed 295 
no significant effect of the method demonstrated (sweep vs. drawer), experimental 296 
condition (C2-C4), trial number, or whether the child copied the irrelevant action, on 297 
whether the relevant action was copied (see supporting information, Table S2).       298 
(ii) Causally irrelevant action. Only 16% of children in the baseline condition 299 
performed the irrelevant action on their first retrieval attempt (T1). By contrast, when 300 
irrelevant actions were demonstrated unanimously (all irrelevant condition: C4), a 301 
significantly larger percentage of children copied the irrelevant action at T1 (86%; 302 
(1) =51.60, p<.001), consistent with our predictions and the high levels of irrelevant 303 
action copying in previous studies (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007). 304 
Similarly, across all trials (T1-T3) combined, the percentage of children’s responses in 305 
the all irrelevant condition that included production of the irrelevant action (81%) was 306 
significantly greater than in the baseline (9%; (1) =167.83, p<.001).  307 
 308 
Majority-Biased Copying 309 
(i) Causally relevant actions. Consistent with our predictions, Figure 2 310 
demonstrates that at T1 children in the relevant actions only condition (C1: N=51) 311 
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copied the majority significantly above chance when faced with demonstrations of two 312 
different, yet causally equivalent, relevant actions (binomial test: 76% copied majority, 313 
±95% CI [62% – 87%], p<.001). Likewise, children in this condition continued to 314 
demonstrate majority-biased copying when all responses across T1-T3 combined were 315 
considered (option bias test statistic = 4.39; p<.001; majority: 73%, minority: 27%).  316 
(ii) Causally irrelevant action. Participants were scored as demonstrating a 317 
majority bias if they copied the majority’s behavior with regard to omitting (minority 318 
irrelevant; C2) or performing (majority irrelevant; C3) the irrelevant action. As expected, 319 
there was a strong preference for the efficient majority solution in the minority 320 
irrelevant condition at T1 (binomial test: 84% copied the majority, 95% CI [71%, 93%], 321 
p<.001), that remained across T1-T3 combined (option bias test statistic = 7.70; p<.001; 322 
majority: 85%, minority: 15%; see Figure 2).  323 
In contrast, but in line with predictions, majority-biased copying was not 324 
observed in the majority irrelevant condition at T1, where most children copied the 325 
minority’s omission of the irrelevant action (binomial test: 41% copied the majority, 326 
95% CI [27% – 56%], p=.25). Majority-biased copying was also not observed across T1-327 
T3 combined, where most children continued to copy the minority person’s more 328 
efficient solution (option bias test statistic = 1.82; p<.08; majority: 39.5%, minority: 329 
60.5%). Children in the majority irrelevant condition were influenced by the order in 330 
which the majority and minority performed:  they more often copied the demonstration 331 
witnessed first (64% of all responses matched the solution demonstrated first: Fisher’s 332 
Exact Test, p<0.001).   333 
 334 
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Demonstrator Unanimity and Copying Persistence Across Trials  335 
Previous research suggests children persist with performing an irrelevant action 336 
at high levels after observing a single demonstrator, despite hands-on experience of 337 
task mechanics (Lyons et al., 2007; Wood et al., 2012). Children also typically persist in 338 
performing a demonstrated relevant solution, even when other equally efficacious 339 
solutions are discoverable (Wood et al., 2013a).  Here we additionally examined the 340 
effects of demonstrator unanimity on both initial copying (in T1), and on children’s 341 
persistence with the demonstrated method across all trials (T1-T3; i.e., children 342 
performed this action in each of the three response trials).  343 
(i) Unanimous demonstrators.  Within the all irrelevant condition (C4), where 344 
both causally relevant and irrelevant actions were demonstrated unanimously, the level 345 
of irrelevant action copying (86%) did not differ significantly from the high level of 346 
causally relevant action copying (96%) at T1 (McNemar Test: (1) =1.78, p=.18). 347 
However, in contrast, children were less likely to persist with the irrelevant action in 348 
each of the three trials (T1-T3) (70%) than the relevant action (92%; McNemar Test: 349 
(1) =5.88, p=.02), suggesting that fidelity erodes more quickly for irrelevant actions.   350 
(ii) Causally relevant actions.  We compared the behavior of children who 351 
witnessed a unanimous demonstration of the causally relevant action (i.e., sweep or 352 
drawer retrieval, C2-C4 combined, N=150) with that of children who witnessed a less-353 
than-unanimous majority (causal actions only, C1, N=51).  Children were significantly 354 
more likely to adopt the relevant action at T1 when it was unanimously demonstrated 355 
than when it was demonstrated by a less-than-unanimous majority (Unanimous=96%, 356 
Not Unanimous= 76%: (1) =8.32, p<.004), and were also more likely to persist with 357 
copying the unanimous demonstration across T1-T3 (Unanimous=89%, Not 358 
Unanimous= 63%: (1) =16.91, p<.001).  Thus, children were more likely to both 359 
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adopt and persist with the majority action when the demonstration was unanimous 360 
compared to when it was not unanimous.  361 
 (iii) Causally irrelevant actions.  Logistic regression models, including 362 
participants’ sex and age, were used to examine the effect of demonstrator unanimity on 363 
children’s copying of the irrelevant action. The baseline condition was included for 364 
comparison in analyses of children’s initial copying of irrelevant actions in T1 (C2-C5, 365 
N=201), but dropped from analyses of their persistence in copying the irrelevant action 366 
across trials (T1-T3; C2-C4, N=150) as it lacked the variation required to fit a logistic 367 
regression (i.e., no children in the baseline condition performed the irrelevant action in 368 
all trials).  369 
The frequency of demonstrators performing the irrelevant action strongly 370 
influenced both children’s initial copying of it in T1 (GLM: (3) =81.20, p<.001), and 371 
their persistence with it across T1-T3 (GLM:(2) = 51.19, p<.001). Pairwise 372 
comparisons between conditions (see Figure 3 and Table 2) revealed that levels of 373 
initial and persistent irrelevant action copying decreased sharply from unanimous 374 
demonstration (all irrelevant: T1: 86%, T1-T3: 70%) to non-unanimous demonstration 375 
of the irrelevant action, including when the irrelevant action was demonstrated by the 376 
majority (majority irrelevant: T1: 41%, T1-T3: 21%). There was a further sharp 377 
reduction in children’s initial (T1) copying of the irrelevant action when the number of 378 
demonstrators performing the irrelevant action dropped from three (majority 379 
irrelevant: 41%) to just one (minority irrelevant: 14%) out of four, although this initial 380 
difference did not remain significant when we considered children’s persistence in 381 
performing the irrelevant action across T1-T3.  Thus, when the demonstrators were not 382 
unanimous, children were influenced by the number of demonstrators who performed 383 
the irrelevant action at T1, but this did not translate into differences in persistence with 384 
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the causally irrelevant behavior across trials. Comparisons of irrelevant action 385 
production with the baseline condition (16%) revealed that the percentage of children 386 
who performed the irrelevant action at T1 did not increase when it was demonstrated 387 
by the minority (minority irrelevant), but increased sharply when demonstrated by a 388 
non-unanimous (majority irrelevant) or unanimous majority (all irrelevant).  389 
Across conditions (C2-C5) children’s age correlated negatively with irrelevant 390 
action performance at T1, such that older children produced fewer irrelevant actions 391 
(Table 2; supporting information Figure S1). However, the negative effect of age on 392 
irrelevant action copying (in conditions C2-C4) in T1 was confined to conditions in 393 
which the irrelevant action was not unanimously demonstrated (i.e., the majority 394 
irrelevant and minority irrelevant conditions), and was still significant following 395 
removal of the all irrelevant and baseline conditions from the analysis (C2-C3, Z = -2.04, 396 
Odds ratio = 0.95, p=.041, N=100). By contrast, children’s age had no significant effect 397 
on persistence in copying the irrelevant action across T1-T3, even when the analysis 398 
was confined to conditions with non-unanimous demonstration of the irrelevant action.  399 
Thus the initial (T1) tendency for increased copying of the efficient solution in older 400 
children was not maintained across repeated trials.   401 
Although there was no effect of sex on children’s initial performance of the 402 
irrelevant action (T1), boys were less likely to persist with the irrelevant action (T1-T3) 403 
than girls (Table 2). Follow-up analysis revealed no interaction effect between sex and 404 
age.  405 
 406 
Discussion 407 
The results presented here contribute an important new perspective to our 408 
understanding of human cultural transmission, and in particular to work on both ‘over-409 
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imitation’ and majority-biased copying. The findings provide direct evidence that 410 
adaptive learning biases are implemented more flexibly than previously thought, and 411 
are substantially altered by both the social context (unanimity of demonstrators) and 412 
the type of actions demonstrated (causally relevant vs. irrelevant).  As expected, we 413 
found that the previously reported pervasiveness of ‘over-imitation’ (Chudek et al., 414 
2016; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2011; Nielsen & 415 
Tomaselli, 2010) is substantially diminished in the more real-world situation of non-416 
unanimous demonstrations, and that majority-biased copying did not extend to 417 
majorities who performed irrelevant actions, despite being detected in all instances 418 
where the majority performed a causally efficient task solution. Rather than 419 
representing a ‘puzzling’ and ‘mindless’ peculiarity of human imitation, or a “copy-all, 420 
correct-later” strategy (Chudek et al., 2016; Whiten et al., 2009), our data suggest that 421 
the occurrence of so-called ‘over-imitation’ instead fits with the operation of a highly 422 
flexible, selective, and adaptive high-fidelity copying mechanism in our species. 423 
 424 
Irrelevant Action Copying 425 
In line with previous research (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007), 426 
children copied the irrelevant action at high levels when it was demonstrated 427 
unanimously, despite the instrumental framing of our task. Our experimental design 428 
offers some insight regarding the competing hypotheses proposed to explain why 429 
children and adults copy irrelevant information at such high levels in this context. For 430 
instance, it is unlikely that children in the all irrelevant condition blindly copied the 431 
irrelevant action as causally necessary (Lyons et al., 2011, 2007), as explanations based 432 
solely on assumptions about causal understanding imply that once the redundancy of 433 
the irrelevant action has been demonstrated (i.e., at least one demonstrator omits the 434 
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irrelevant action), children should not show sensitivity to the relative frequency of 435 
demonstrators performing or omitting the irrelevant actions. However, demonstrator 436 
frequency did influence children’s irrelevant action copying in our study: children were 437 
more likely to perform the irrelevant action in the majority irrelevant than minority 438 
irrelevant condition. The low level of irrelevant action production in the baseline 439 
condition further implies that causal understanding of what was and was not required 440 
to extract the reward was not problematic for participants in any of the age groups. 441 
Considered together, these findings suggest that children’s copying was influenced not 442 
by causal understanding but by demonstrator behavior.  443 
Older children (age 6) were less likely to copy irrelevant actions at T1 than 444 
younger children (age 4), but only where irrelevant actions were not demonstrated 445 
unanimously. Previous studies in which the irrelevant action was demonstrated 446 
unanimously have found that irrelevant action copying increases with age (McGuigan et 447 
al., 2011, 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). A plausible explanation for these combined 448 
findings is that unanimous demonstrations generate normative pressures to copy 449 
behavior as the ‘way it is done,’ despite the child’s knowledge that it is causally 450 
unnecessary, which increases with age (Moraru, Gomez, & McGuigan, 2016). (Note that 451 
this amounts in effect to a sort of group-level rational imitation:  If everyone does it this 452 
way, there must be a good reason for it.) However, when demonstrators vary in their 453 
performance of the irrelevant action, as in our study, the pressure to conform is 454 
substantially reduced and becomes increasingly undermined by age-related increases in 455 
discarding the majority behavior for more accurate or reliable behavior (Einav, 2014; 456 
Seston & Kelemen, 2014).  457 
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 458 
Majority-Biased Copying 459 
These results provide strong evidence that while young children do use majority 460 
behavior as a heuristic to guide instrumental learning, they are able to do so flexibly, 461 
calibrating their decision-making according to additional cues, such as the majority’s 462 
perceived efficiency. Wilks et al. (2015) found that children were more likely to copy a 463 
successful minority than an unsuccessful majority, despite being more likely to copy the 464 
majority when both the majority and minority solutions were equally successful. Here 465 
we extended Wilks and colleagues’ investigation to superfluous behavior that did not 466 
result in goal failure, using a different measure of majority copying that allows us to 467 
make additional inferences about the cultural evolution of so-called ‘over-imitation’. 468 
Majority-biased copying (regarded as a key strategy for acquiring safe and effective 469 
behavior; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Wolf et al., 2013) was strongest when the majority 470 
demonstrated the inefficiency of the minority’s irrelevant action, and did not extend to a 471 
majority that performed irrelevant actions. Thus, children do not blindly follow the 472 
crowd. 473 
While some evidence for majority-biased transmission has been observed in 474 
other species (notably non-human primates; Haun et al., 2012), it remains untested 475 
whether nonhuman animals are able to calibrate majority-biased copying according to 476 
additional cues such as the efficiency of the majority’s behavior. It is plausible that 477 
humans’ ability to adjust adaptive learning heuristics flexibly and selectively – such as 478 
their tendency to follow the crowd – in concert with their remarkable ability to engage 479 
in high-fidelity copying, has played a major evolutionary role in the generation of our 480 
species’ remarkable cultural prowess relative to nonhuman animals.   481 
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 482 
Implications for Cultural Evolution 483 
Cultural evolutionary theory states that a behavioral trait must be copied at 484 
levels proportional to the trait in the population if the trait is to be maintained at its 485 
current levels (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Our data therefore suggest that majority-486 
biased copying could potentially stabilize functionally relevant behaviors within a 487 
population over time, but not behaviors that contain functionally redundant 488 
information. That is, most participants who witnessed the majority perform an 489 
irrelevant action copied the minority’s more efficient solution, both at T1 and across all 490 
three trials combined. Additionally, participants who saw the majority performing the 491 
irrelevant action were not more likely to persist in performing it across trials than those 492 
who saw it performed by the minority. Moreover, there was a strong bias towards 493 
copying a majority who demonstrated greater behavioral efficiency over a minority, and 494 
children showed a greater tendency to reproduce the causally relevant than causally 495 
irrelevant action across trials following unanimous demonstration.   496 
Taken together, our findings imply that without additional reinforcement of the 497 
irrelevant action (e.g., sanctions, punishments, explicit teaching, or other normative or 498 
social pressures), majority behavior containing functionally redundant information will 499 
rapidly evolve to a more efficient solution (i.e., irrelevant action omission), which would 500 
likely continue to increase towards fixation. However, by adding ritualistic or normative 501 
contextual cues (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2013; 502 
Legare & Nielsen, 2015) or providing clear social functions (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over 503 
& Carpenter, 2012) to causally irrelevant actions in unanimous and non-unanimous 504 
demonstrations, a different pattern of results, and possibly majority-biased copying of 505 
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irrelevant actions, might emerge, clarifying further what triggers causally irrelevant 506 
action copying. 507 
We also anticipate that had the causally irrelevant action in our study 508 
encompassed more substantial efficiency costs, we would have observed lower rates of 509 
irrelevant action copying and faster rates of erosion over time; a suggestion consistent 510 
with the findings of Keupp et al. (2016). Varying the ratio of majority versus minority 511 
demonstrators who performed the irrelevant action (for example 25:1 instead of 3:1), 512 
would also plausibly affect the rate of erosion, as would manipulating the relative age 513 
(Wood et al., 2012), group membership (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015), or status 514 
(McGuigan, 2013; though see Chudek et al., 2016) of the demonstrators. Examining the 515 
interaction of different types of learning biases in irrelevant action copying is an area 516 
ripe for future research.  517 
 518 
Conclusions 519 
To our knowledge, we present the first evidence that young children flexibly and 520 
adaptively adopt a majority-biased learning strategy when faced with an instrumental 521 
learning goal and the opportunity to integrate social information from multiple 522 
individuals. Majority-biased copying did not extend to causally inefficient and irrelevant 523 
actions, despite these being copied at high levels when demonstrated unanimously. 524 
Akin to the findings of Asch (1956) with adults, when just one individual dissented from 525 
the majority, ‘over-imitation’ plummeted. Thus, our data suggest that the presence of 526 
causally irrelevant actions might substantially alter the operation of adaptive learning 527 
biases. This finding has obvious implications for cultural evolutionary theory; namely 528 
that causally irrelevant, and potentially costly, actions are unlikely to be maintained in 529 
causal or instrumental real-world contexts where behavioral traits are often not 530 
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exhibited unanimously.  Rather, in many − perhaps most − circumstances, socially-531 
transmitted behavior is expected to evolve towards efficient solutions.   532 
An easily envisaged exception to this expectation is when instances of copying 533 
causally irrelevant actions serve social, ritualistic or normative purposes. As children 534 
showed sensitivity to the degree of unanimity in demonstrator behavior, our findings 535 
provide support for the operation of socially-driven motivations, and explanations, in 536 
causally irrelevant action copying. However, we suggest that the term ‘over-imitation’ is 537 
inaccurate and misleading when copying of causally irrelevant actions encompasses 538 
socially functional properties, as their performance in this instance no longer 539 
represents puzzling or irrational behavior.  To the contrary, our findings illustrate a 540 
flexible, and highly functional, integration of social learning strategies, through which 541 
individuals combine social and non-social sources of information to home in rapidly on 542 
the relevant actions in instrumental tasks, while remaining sensitive to the social 543 
functions of imitation. This suggests that our species might more accurately be cast as 544 
broadly ‘optimal’ rather than ‘over’-imitators. 545 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. Overview of the Demonstration and Baseline Conditions 
 
Condition   
Majority solution 
(3 demonstrators) 
  
 
Minority solution 
 (1 demonstrator) 
 
N 
 
(C1) 
Causal actions only 
 
  
All retrieve using the 
same relevant action 
(sweep OR drawer) 
  
Retrieves using the 
alternate relevant 
action 
51 
(C2) 
Minority irrelevant 
All retrieve using the 
same relevant action 
(sweep OR drawer) 
only 
 
Performs irrelevant 
action then retrieves 
using the same 
relevant action as the 
majority 
 
51 
(C3) 
Majority irrelevant 
  
All perform the 
irrelevant action before 
retrieval. All use the 
same relevant action 
(sweep OR drawer) 
  
 
Retrieves using the 
same relevant action as 
the majority, without 
performing the 
irrelevant action 
 
49 
(C4) 
All irrelevant 
  
 
All demonstrators perform the irrelevant action 
before retrieval. All use the same relevant action 
(sweep OR drawer)  
 
50 
 
(C5) 
Baseline 
 
No demonstration 51 
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Table 2. The Effects of Experimental Condition and Age on Whether the Irrelevant Action 
was Performed at T1 (C2 - C5), and Persistently Across T1-T3 (C2-C4) 
 
 
Model parameters 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons 
 
Estimate (S.E.) 
 
Odds 
ratio 
 
 
Model T1 
 
  Intercept 
     
      
 
     0.66(1.21)
NS
 
 
 
 
   Condition
a
 
 
        All (C4) – Majority (C3) 
        All (C4) – Minority (C2) 
        All (C4) – Baseline (C5) 
Baseline (C5) – Minority (C2) 
Majority (C3) – Minority (C2) 
  Majority (C3) – Baseline (C5) 
      2.25(0.51)
***
 
      3.81(0.60)
***
 
      3.81(0.60)
***
 
  -0.005(0.58)
NS
        
      1.56(0.51)
*
                
      1.56(0.51)
*
                 
9.49 
45.15 
45.15 
1.00 
4.76 
4.76 
  Participant’s age
b
        -0.04(0.02)
*
 0.96 
  Participant’s sex
c       -0.33(0.37)
 
NS
 
0.72 
  Total model: R
2
 = 0.46
 
(Nagelkerke), (5) =84.41, p<.001 
    
Model T1-T3    
   
Intercept 
       
     -0.71(1.48)
 
NS
 
 
Condition
a
            All (C4) – Minority (C2)    
            All (C4) – Majority (C3) 
  Majority (C3) – Minority (C2) 
3.48(0.63)
*** 
  2.18(0.48)
*** 
1.30(0.63)
NS 
32.57 
8.87 
3.67 
  Participant’s age
b
  -0.02(0.02)
NS 
0.98 
  Participant’s sex
c
      -1.01(0.44)
* 
0.37 
  Total model: R2= 0.43 (Nagelkerke), (4) = 55.76, p<.001 
 
a 
Categorical variable (see Table 1); 
b 
Numeric variable (age in months); 
c  
Dichotomous variable (0 = female, 1 
= male);
 NS 
p>.05; * p<.05; ***p<.001
Page 32 of 36Developmental Science
RUNNING HEAD: Over-imitation and majority copying in children 33
List of figure legends 
 
 
Figure 1a – c. The Sweep-Drawer Box. Demonstrator Releasing the Capsule by Pushing 
the Sweep Manipulandum (a), or Pulling the Drawer Manipulandum (b). Demonstrator 
Performing the Irrelevant Action on the Door Prior to Capsule Release (c). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of Participants Copying the Majority Behavior (Chance Level 
Copying Indicated by Dashed Line) at T1 and Across All Three Trials Combined (Collapsed 
Across Age Groups, C1- C3)  
 
<insert Figure 2 > 
 
***p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of Participants Performing the Irrelevant Action at T1 and 
Persistently Across T1-T3 (Collapsed Across Age Groups, C2-C5)  
 
<insert Figure 3> 
 
***p<.001, *p<.05, 
 NS
 p>.05. Comparisons with baseline were made at T1 only. Binomial 
standard errors.  
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